Understanding the limits of predictability of biological evolution is a question of both practical and theoretical interest. A key inquiry along these lines is whether genetic diversity persists or not as a result of evolutionary pressures. We explore this question in the case of diploid species, i.e., organisms with two chromosomes per gene, which includes humans and the vast majority of all living organisms. Informally, genetic diversity is shown to be sustainable (even likely) in diploid species, but hard to predict even if we restrict ourselves to species with a single gene. This reveals a stark dichotomy when compared to the case of haploid species where diversity dies out [30] , hinting at a strong evolutionary advantage that could help explain the near universal adoption of diploidy in living systems.
Introduction
The notions of phenotypic diversity and biological evolution are intrinsically linked to each other. This coupling has in fact a strong historical element to it, since it is well documented that Darwin's inception of his theory of evolution was precisely inspired by the exquisite diversity of Galapagos' natural ecosystem. Despite its long history, spanning nearly two centuries, remarkably this seminal connection still remains a continuous source of inspiration for scientific investigation.
The undeniable correlation between evolution and genetic diversity, however, does not automatically imply a similarly strong causal relationship. At a first glance, this tighter connection appears almost unavoidable, since sexual reproduction is tantamount to genetic mixing. Critically, however, (sexual) evolution is comprised both of gene recombination and natural selection. The first mechanism does intuitively encourage genetic diversity, however, the second suppresses it. The persistence, or not, of genetic diversity thus lies on the balance depending on the outcome of this competition between these two opposing forces.
Despite the existence of precise mathematical formulations of the mechanisms of sexual evolution dating back to the work of Fisher, Haldane, and Wright [1] in the beginning of the twentieth century, the exact nature of the relationship between evolution and diversity has still not been fully fleshed out. In fact, we still rely heavily on simulations and experimental studies [20] . Of course, this is to some extent inevitable since the involved dynamical systems are highly nonlinear [12, 37] . Furthermore, these systems allow for many degrees of freedom, hence any scalable, practically useful theory must necessarily admit a strong computational component. Recently, computer scientists have focused on this challenge in the hope of providing a fresh perspective to century old questions.
Along this line, Chastain et al. [4, 5] have explored connections between sexual evolution in haploid species 1 and behavioral dynamics in coordination games. These dynamics belong to the family of replicator dynamics 2 , which is known to be closely related to the multiplicative weights update algorithm (MWUA) [24] . The authors show that given a randomly chosen payoff matrix these systems admit in expectation an exponential number of mixed, polymorphic equilibria. Leveraging the convergence of such dynamics in coordination games, this result appears to be a promising indicator that diversity does indeed follow as a result of sexual selection. Indeed, the number of polymorphic equilibria completely dominates the number of monomorphic ones (at most linear). Nevertheless, this illusion is shattered when we examine the stability properties of these states.
In [30] , Mehta et al. show that in any generic coordination game all mixed (polymorphic) equilibria are unstable. Moreover, for all but a zero measure of initial conditions the system converges to monomorphic equilibria. In other words, genetic diversity is being completely suppressed in these haploid systems. Although in principle, even in these systems, genetic diversity could be safeguarded by other evolutionary mechanisms which are orthogonal to natural selection 3 , this result offers an interesting and somewhat counter-intuitive perspective: Sexual selection may act antagonistically to the preservation of genetic and thus phenotypic diversity.
From the perspective of biology, however, the key relevant case of interest is that of diploid species. The majority of complex species, e.g., humans, are diploid organisms 4 . The immediate question that emerges then is whether and to what extent these negative results carry over to species with two chromosomes per gene. How is the phenotypic diversity witnessed by Darwin on the Galapagos islands explained?
Interestingly, from the perspective of computer science, these two systems (haploid/diploid sexual evolution) can be interpreted in a rather similar fashion. This interpretation is as follows: In both cases each individual receives exactly one chromosome from each of its parents and then its probability of passing its genes to the next generation depends in the same way on its resulting fitness. Their main difference is that in the case of diploid species the individual's fitness depends on the chromosomes received by both parents, whereas in the haploid case its fitness depends on a single of its parents chromosomes (we view the other one as randomly discarded). Indeed, formal reductions between systems of haploid and diploid evolution are possible, however the extinction of diversity results of [30] do not always carry over to the case of diploid systems [18] . This is due to the fact that these reductions embed the diploid systems into lower dimensional manifolds of haploid systems. As a result, the notions of measure, local neighborhood, stability do not translate between the two systems and new analysis, techniques are required.
Our Results. Genetic diversity is shown to be sustainable (even likely) in diploid species, but hard to predict even if we restrict ourselves to species with a single gene. When compared to the case of haploid species where diversity dies out [30] , this hints at a strong evolutionary advantage that could help explain the near universal adoption of diploidy in living systems.
Our approach revolves around bounding the likelihood of the existence of stable mixed (i.e., polymorphic, genetically diverse) equilibria given randomly chosen system parameters as well as characterizing the complexity of the corresponding decision problem. Critically, our results are structurally robust along several dimensions (e.g., choice of parameter distribution, choice of stability concept, restriction to biologically relevant subclasses of system instances). This is a strong indication that they are not an artifact of problem formulation, but instead reflect actual properties of biological systems.
The paper is organized in three sections. The first section argues about convergence, stability, and characterization of stable states. The second section leverages the stability characterizations to argue about the long term survival of diversity. The final section presents a wide range of hardness results for deciding about the persistence of diversity.
Technically, the first section grapples with the issues of characterizing equilibrium stability and arguing how it affects system behavior. We strengthen classic results about convergence to equilibria [27, 28] to results about pointwise convergence to stable equilibria for all but a negligible (zero measure) set of initial conditions. The notion of stability is rather subtle with several slightly different interpretations. Each of them is motivated by distinct practical considerations (e.g. attracting stability versus no-drift (plateau-like) stability). Given the centrality of the notion of stability in dynamical systems this space of variations has been explored to great detail. We map out this web of relationships and, provide characterizations for these notions in our setting of diploid sexual evolution.
The second section examines whether we should expect genetic diversity to survive in practice. This is a tricky issue to capture mathematically since the system evolution depends both on its initial conditions as well as on the choice of parameters values. In order to argue about the plausibility of genetic diversity, we construct sufficient conditions (on the space of parameter values) so that diversity survives for all (but a zero measure of) initial conditions. Next, we show that if the parameters values are chosen independently from any continuous distribution then this condition is satisfied with constant probability (at least 1/3). We complement these results by presenting sufficient conditions for the extinction of genetic diversity, implying that our positive result is, in some sense, tight.
Given that survival of genetic diversity depends critically on the system parameters, the third section examines the complexity of the corresponding decision problem. Informally, the decision problem is of the form "Does the system have a polymorphic X-stable equilibrium?", where in the place of X we consider multiple variants of strong (asymptotic, attracting) and weak stability. These questions are shown to capture exactly whether diversity survives in the limit. All the corresponding decision problems are shown to be NP-hard, whereas for several of them we have completeness as well. The reductions follow from k-Clique, however, each notion of stability needs a standalone, different reduction. Although our reductions hold for diploid species with a single locus/gene and thus capture a minimal setting, the fitness landscape is as usually chosen in a completely adversarial fashion so as to create hard instances. Specifically, our construction allows for a linear number of locally optimal monomorphic states, whereas under random parameter realization their expected number is equal to one. It is natural to ask whether the problem becomes easier when we restrict ourselves to this class of instances. We show that this is not so by extending all our NP-hardness results to this case as well. 5 Finally, the introduction discusses connections between our setting of diploid sexual evolution and discrete replicator dynamics in coordination games. These connections follow from prior work of Losert and Akin [27] but are still useful since they allow us to frame much of the discussion in a more familiar, game theoretic language.
Related Work
Computer Science and Evolution. In the last couple of years we have witnessed a rapid cascade of theoretical results on the intersection of computer science and evolution. In one of the earliest results, Livnat et al. [25] introduced the notion of mixability, the ability of an allele to combine itself successfully with other alleles within a specific population. This proxy, which can be thought of as a notion of average utility, was shown to correlate strongly with the rate of change of the proportions of different alleles for a specific gene/locus. This interpretation left open the tantalizing possibility of closely coupling standard models of haploid evolution with game theoretic dynamics. Indeed, in [5, 3] such connections where made explicit. The dynamic in question is the discrete replicator dynamics [21] . Analogous game theoretic interpretations are known for models of diploid sexual evolution [27] . Although the haploid systems in [5, 3] have in expectation exponentially many polymorphic equilibria, Mehta, Panageas and Piliouras [30] show that all mixed (polymorphic) equilibria are unstable and evolution converges to monomorphic equilibria.
On the other hand, it is possible to introduce connections between satisfiability and evolution [26] . Boolean phenotypic features (e.g., large/small wings) can be encoded as Boolean functions on the space of genotypes. Specifically, Livnat et al. show that if we start from initial conditions such that a target Boolean function is satisfied with polynomially large probability then evolutionary pressures suffice to lead to the fixation of such advantageous properties fast.
It is well established that biological mechanisms are prone to errors [16] . The error threshold property of mutations, namely a rate of error during the reproduction phase above which genetic information disappears [14] , has been utilized successfully to design drug strategies that attempt to mutate viruses to death [15, 9] . Vishnoi [39] showed the existence of such sharp thresholds. Moreover, in [40] Vishnoi sheds light on the speed of evolution. Specifically, this work analyzes the speed of convergence of systems with multiple competing species. The evolutionary dynamics here are stochastic and in the case of two species the mixing time is shown to be logarithmic in the size of the state space. Finally, in [11] Dixit, Srivastava and Vishnoi present finite populations models for asexual haploid evolution that closely track the standard infinite population quasi-species models of Eigen [13] .
Hardness of Nash equilibrium in Games. Megiddo and Papadimitriou [29] observed that the Nash equilibrium problem is not amenable to standard complexity classes like NP, due to the guaranteed existence [33] . To overcome this Papadimitriou defined class PPAD [35] , and showed containment of two-player Nash equilibrium problem (2-Nash) in PPAD. Later, in a remarkable series of works [10, 6] , the problem was shown to be PPAD-complete. For three or more players the problem was shown to be FIXP-complete [17] .
On the other hand Gilboa and Zemel [19] showed that almost every decision version of 2-Nash is NP-complete. This included questions like, checking if there exist more than one NE, an NE with support size k, an NE with payoff h, and many more. Conitzer and Sandholm [7] extended these results to symmetric games, as well as to hardness of approximation and counting.
The games related to the evolutionary process (under consideration in this paper) are symmetric coordination games. Coordination games are very special and always have a pure NE; easy to find in case of two-players. For network coordination games Cai and Daskalakis [2] showed that finding pure NE is PLS-complete, while for mixed NE it is in CLS. As far as we know, no NP-completeness results are known for decision questions on two-player coordination games, and our results may help shed some light on these questions.
Preliminaries
In this section we briefly describe the evolutionary dynamics on diploid with single locus, which has been studied extensively in mathematical biology [31, 32, 27, 28] , and relate it to symmetric co-ordination game with two-players.
Notations:
We use boldface letters, like x, to denote column vectors, and x i to denote its i th coordinate. To denote a row vector we use x T . Vectors 0 n and 1 n are n-dimensional all zeros and all ones vectors respectively. For matrix A, A ij denotes entry in i th row and j th column. By norm . we mean infinity-norm . ∞ . To denote a index set {1, . . . , n} we use [n], and ∆ n denotes n-dimensional simplex. For a vector x ∈ ∆ n , its support set is denoted by SP (x) = {i | x i > 0}.
Evolutionary dynamics
Let A be a fitness matrix of a diploid single locus species. Let there be n alleles numbered 1, . . . , n, for the locus. Let A ij is the fitness of the offspring with chromosome pair (i, j) for the locus, then clearly A is a symmetric n × n dimensional matrix. Let x ∈ ∆ n be the proportion of alleles in the current population, then under evolutionary process this proportion changes as per the following multi-variate function f : ∆ n → ∆ n 6 .
If
Clearly, if there are limiting points of f then they have to be fixed-points, i.e., x such that f (x) = x. Note that, f is a continuous function with convex, compact domain (= range), and therefore always has a fixed-point [23] . 6 In the literature the dynamics are often called Discrete Replicator Dynamics A fundamental question is: starting from arbitrary population of alleles how does the population look like in limit under evolution governed by f , or does it even converge to a particular population in limit. Fisher's Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection [27, 28] says that mean fitness function π(x) = x T Ax (potential function in game theory terms) satisfies the inequality π(f (x)) ≥ π(x) and the equality holds iff x is a fixed point. Losert and Akin [27, 28] showed that the dynamics above converge point-wise to fixed points and that the rule of the dynamics f is a diffeomorphism in ∆ n . Formally:
Let {z(t)} be an orbit for the dynamic of (1). As t approaches ∞, z(t) converges to a unique fixed-point r. Additionally, the map f corresponding to (1) is a diffeomorphism, i.e. it is a one-to-one, onto, and smooth function whose inverse function is also smooth.
In section 4 we characterize the limiting points of (1) with stability, and Nash equilibria of game (A, A). Next we briefly describe games and Nash equilibria.
Games, Nash equilibria and symmetries
In this paper we consider two-player games, where each player has finitely many pure strategies (moves). Let S i , i = 1, 2 be the set of strategies for player i, and let m def = |S 1 | and n def = |S 2 |, then such a game can be represented by two payoff matrices A and B of dimension m × n, where payoff to the players are A ij and B ij respectively if the first plays i and the second plays j.
Players may randomize among their strategies. The set of mixed strategies for the first player is ∆ m , and for the second player is ∆ n . The expected payoffs of the first-player and second-player from a mixed-strategy (x, y) ∈ ∆ m × ∆ n are, respectively
A strategy profile is said to be a Nash equilibrium strategy profile (NE) if no player achieves a better payoff by a unilateral deviation [33] . Formally, (x, y) ∈ ∆ m × ∆ n is a NE iff ∀x ∈ ∆ m , x T Ay ≥ x T Ay and ∀y ∈ ∆ n , x T By ≥ x T By .
Given strategy y for the second-player, the first-player gets (Ay) k from her k th strategy. Clearly, her best strategies are arg max k (Ay) k , and a mixed strategy fetches the maximum payoff only if she randomizes among her best strategies. Similarly, given x for the first-player, the second-player gets (x T B) k from k th strategy, and same conclusion applies. These can be equivalently stated as the following complementarity type conditions,
In a symmetric game the strategy sets of both the players are identical, i.e., m = n, and S 1 = S 2 . We will use n, S and ∆ n to denote number of strategies, the strategy set and the mixed strategy set respectively of the players in such a game. A Nash equilibrium profile (x, y) ∈ ∆ n × ∆ n is called symmetric if x = y. Note that at a symmetric strategy profile (x, x) both the players get payoff x T Ax. Using (2) it follows that x ∈ ∆ n is a symmetric NE of game (A, A T ), with payoff π to both players, if and only if,
Symmetric Coordination Game. In a coordination game B = A, i.e., both the players get the same payoff in each (randomized) outcome. Thus if A is symmetric then (A, A) is a symmetric coordination game. The next statement follows using (3) and Remark 3.1
From now on by mixed (fixed-point) strategy we mean strictly mixed (fixed-point) strategy, i.e., x such that |SP (x)| > 1, and (fixed-point) strategy that is not strictly-mixed are called pure.
Convergence, Stability, and Characterization
In this section we define various notions of stability based on dynamics f (1), on eigenvalues of the Jacobian at the converging point, and on symmetric NE of game (A, A) (where A is a symmetric matrix), and establish relations between them. This will give us partial characterization of limiting points of the dynamics, which we will use in the later sections to analyze the likelihood of survival of diversity, and the hardness of checking the same. We start with the definitions w.r.t. the dynamics that are well-known. We fix A to be a real symmetric matrix.
if it stable and there exists a (neighborhood) δ > 0 such that, for all p ∈ ∆ with p − r < δ we have that f n (p) − r → 0 as n → ∞.
By definition it follows that if x is asymptotically stable w.r.t. dynamics f (1), then the set of initial conditions in ∆ so that the dynamics converge to x has positive measure. In Section 3.1 we saw that under f potential function π(x) = x T Ax strictly increases unless x is a fixed-point. Using this fact the following theorem was derived in [28] . (1) is stable if and only if it is a local maximum of fitness (potential) function π, and is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict local maximum of π.
As the domain of π is closed and bounded there exists a global maximum of π in ∆ n , which by Theorem 4.3 is a stable fixed-point, and therefore its existence follows. However, existence of asymptotically stable fixed-point is not guaranteed, for example if A = [1] m×n then no x ∈ ∆ n is attracting under f . To analyze limiting points of f with respect to stable fixed-points we need to use the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of f at fixed-points. The following well-known theorem in dynamics/control theory relates (asymptotically) stable fixed-points with eigenvalues of the Jacobian at the fixed-point. [36] If Jacobian J x at x has at least one eigenvalue with absolute value strictly greater than 1, then x is unstable. Furthermore, if all the eigenvalues have absolute value strictly less than 1, then it is asymptotically stable. Theorem 4.5 implies that eigenvalues of the Jacobian at a stable fixed-point have absolute value at most 1, however the converse may not hold. In other words, even if all eigenvalues at fixedpoint x * have absolute value at most 1, it may still not be stable. In Theorem 4.7 we manage to discard only those fixed-points whose eigenvalues has absolute value strictly greater than 1, while characterizing limiting points of f ; the latter is finally used to argue about the survival of diversity. So we need to define the following class of fixed points. Definition 4.6. A fixed point r is called linearly stable, if the eigenvalues of J r at r have absolute value less than or equal to 1. Otherwise it is called linearly unstable.
We will relate the limiting points of f to linearly stable fixed points using its eigenvalue property. For that first, we compute the Jacobian of our dynamics f at point x, denoted by J x . Since f is defined on n variables while its domain is ∆ n which is of n − 1 dimension, we consider a projected Jacobian by replacing strategy t with
If x is a fixed-point of f , then using Remark 3.1 the above simplifies to,
Using the above stated properties of J x at a fixed-point, and Theorem 3.2, we show the next theorem in Appendix A.
Theorem 4.7. The set of initial conditions in ∆ n so that the dynamics 1 converge to linearly unstable fixed points has measure zero.
In what follows, we relate different notions of stable fixed-points to special types of symmetric NE of game (A, A).
Stability and Nash equilibria
Given a symmetric matrix A, a two-player game (A, A) forms a symmetric coordination game. In this section we identify special symmetric NE of this game to characterize stable fixed-points of f . Given a profile x ∈ ∆ n , define a transformed matrix
Since A is symmetric it is easy to check that B is also symmetric, and therefore has all real eigenvalues. Recall the Definition 3.4 of strict symmetric NE. Lemma 4.9. For any given x ∈ ∆ n , T (A, x) is negative (definite) semi-definite iff (y T Ay < 0) y T Ay ≤ 0, ∀y ∈ R n with y = 0 such that i y i = 0 and x i = 0 ⇒ y i = 0.
Using the local optimal property of the stable fixed-points, next we map them to Nash stable strategies. Proof There is a similar proof in [28] for a modified claim. Here we connect the two. First of all, observe that if (r, r) is not Nash equilibrium for the (A, A) game then there exists a j such that r j = 0 and (Ar) j > r T Ar. But
Additionally, since r is stable, using Theorem 4.3 we have that r is a local maximum of π(x) = x T Ax, say in a neighborhood x − r < δ. Let y be a vector with support subset of the support of r such that i y i = 0. Firstly we rescale it w.l.o.g so that y < δ and by setting z = y + r we have that z T Az = y T Ay + r T Ar + 2y T Ar
But y T Ar = 0 since (Ar) i = (Ar) j for all i, j s.t r i , r j > 0, i y i = 0 , y has support subset of the support of r. Therefore y T Ay + r T Ar = z T Az ≤ r T Ar, thus y T Ay ≤ 0. Hence proved using Lemma 4.9.
Since stable fixed-points always exist, so do Nash stable strategies (Lemma 4.10) . On the other hand, next lemma shows that strict Nash stable strategies map to asymptotically stable fixed-points, which we know may not exist, and therefore strict Nash stable strategies need not exist. Lemma 4.11 . ([28] § 9.2.5) Every strict Nash stable strategy is an asymptotically stable fixedpoint.
The above two lemmas show strict Nash stable is contained in asymptotically stable (attracting), which is contained in stable (by definition), which is contained in Nash stable. Further, by Theorem 4.5 and the definition of linearly stable fixed-points we know that stable are contained in linearlystable. So then the question is how do Nash stable and linearly stable relate to each other. The next lemma answers this. Proof We will modify the proof § 9.2.5 from [28] . Let t be the removed strategy (variable x t ) to create J r (with r t > 0). For every i such that r i = 0 we have that J r ii = (Ar) i r T Ar and J r ij = 0 for all j = i. Hence the corresponding eigenvalues of J r of the rows i that do not belong in the support of r (i-th row has all zeros except the diagonal entry J r ii = (Ar) i r T Ar ) are (Ar) i r T Ar > 0 which are less than or equal to 1 iff (r, r) is a NE of the game (A, A).
Let J r be the submatrix of J r by removing all columns/rows j / ∈ SP (r). Let A be the submatrix of A by removing all columns/rows j / ∈ SP (r). It suffices to prove that T (A, r) is negative semidefinite iff J r has eigenvalues with absolute value at most 1.
Let k = |SP (r)| and the k × k matrix L with L ij = r i A ij r T Ar and i, j ∈ SP (r). Observe that L is stochastic and also symmetrizes to L ij = √ r i r j A ij r T Ar , i.e L, L have the same eigenvalues. Therefore L has an eigenvalue 1 and the rest eigenvalues are real between (−1, 1) and also A has eigenvalues with the same signs as L .
Finally, we show that det(L − λI k ) = (1 − λ) × det(J r − λI k−1 ) with J r = J r − I k−1 , namely L has the same eigenvalues as J r plus eigenvalue 1. It is true for a square matrix that by adding a multiple of a row/column to another row/column, the determinant stays invariant. We consider L − λI k and we do the following: We subtract the t-th column from every other column and on the resulting matrix, we add every row to the t-th row. The resulting matrix R has the property that det(R) = (1 − λ) × det(J r − λI k−1 ) and also det(R) = det(L − λI k ).
From above we get that if J r has eigenvalues with absolute value at most 1, then J r − I k−1 has eigenvalues in [−2, 0] (we know that are real from the fact that L is symmetrizes to L ), hence L has eigenvalue 1 and the rest eigenvalues are in [−2, 0] (since L is stochastic, the rest eigenvalues lie in (−1, 0] ). Therefore A has positive inertia 1 (see Sylvester's law of inertia) and the one direction follows. For the converse, T (A, r) being negative semi-definite implies A has positive inertia 1, thus L and so L have one eigenvalue positive (which is 1) and the rest non-positive (lie in (−1, 0] since L is stochastic). Thus J r − I k−1 has eigenvalues in (−1, 0] and therefore J r has eigenvalues in (0, 1] (i.e with absolute value at most 1).
Using Theorem 4.3 and Lemmas 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12, we get the following characterization among all the notions of stability that we have discussed so far. Generically, we have hyperbolic fixed points, namely fixed points so that the Jacobian has eigenvalues with absolute value different from 1. In that case due to Theorem 4.5 and Definition 4.6, the inclusions of Theorem 4.13 hold with equality. Next we show invariance of these stable sets under affine transformation of A. Lemma 4.14. Let A be a symmetric matrix, and B = A + c for a c ∈ R, then the set of (asymptotically) stable fixed-points, and the set of (strict) stable Nash strategies of B are identical to that of A.
Proof Observe that x B x = c + x A x so the (strict) local maxima remain the same, and hence (asymptotically) stable fixed-points are unchanged. For linear stability, it is clear that the Jacobian J x remains the same for the strategies that are played with positive probability. For those strategies j that are played with zero probability observe that (Ax
For equivalence of (strict) Nash stable points, the set of (strict) symmetric NE are same for games (A, A) and (B, B) , and matrix T (A, x) = T (B, x), ∀x ∈ ∆ n .
Survival of Diversity
Given a fitness (symmetric) matrix A. in this section we analyze how diverse the population will be in the limit under evolutionary dynamics (governed by f (1)). If the limit point x is not pure, i.e., |SP (x)| > 1 then at least two alleles survive among the population, and we say the population is diverse and not monomorphic in the limit.
We characterize two extreme cases of fitness matrix for the survival of diversity, namely where it always survives and where it never survives regardless of the starting population. Using this characterization we analyze the chances of survival of diversity when fitness matrix and starting populations are picked uniformly at random. By Theorems 4.7 and 4.13 for the diversity to survive there has to be at least one mixed Nash stable strategy. We know that given a symmetric A there always exists a Nash stable strategy, however it need not be mixed. Next lemma characterizes instances that lack mixed Nash stable strategies, using the notion of dominating diagonals. Proof Let r be a fixed point and w.l.o.g strategy 1 is in its support and assume that J r is the projected Jacobian at r by removing strategy 1 (let k × k be its size). J r has diagonal entries
Therefore there exists an eigenvalue with absolute value greater than 1 if k > 0.
The next corollary follows using Theorem 4.7 and Lemma 5.2. Simply put it states that if every diagonal entry of A is dominating then almost surely the dynamics converge to pure fixed points.
Corollary 5.3. If every diagonal entry of A is dominating then the set of initial conditions in ∆ n so that the dynamics 1 converges to mixed fixed points has measure zero, i.e diversity dies almost surely.
Additionally, we show that a pure fixed-point that chooses strategy t, where A tt is dominated, will be linearly unstable. Lemma 5.4 . Let r = (0, ..., 0, 1 t−th , 0, ..., 0) be a pure fixed point of our dynamics, i.e., chooses strategy t with probability 1. If A tt is dominated, then r is linearly unstable (there exists an eigenvalue with absolute value > 1).
Proof The equations of the projected Jacobian J r at r:
By assumption, there exists a t such that A t t > A tt and hence J r will have A t t Att > 1 as an eigenvalue.
If there are no pure fixed points that are linearly stable, then all linearly stable fixed-points are mixed, and thus the next corollary follows using Theorem 4.7 and Lemma 5.4. In words it says that if every diagonal entry of A is dominated then almost surely the dynamics converge to mixed fixed points.
Corollary 5.5. If every diagonal entry of A is dominated then the set of initial conditions in ∆ n so that the dynamics 1 converge to pure fixed points has measure zero, i.e diversity survives almost surely.
The following lemma shows that when the fitness matrix is picked uniformly at random, there is a positive probability (bounded away from zero for all n) so that every diagonal in A is dominated. This essentially means that generically, diversity survives with positive probability, bounded away from zero, for all n where the randomness is taken with respect to both the payoff matrix and initial conditions. Lemma 5.6. Assume that each entry is chosen iid from a continuous distribution. The probability that every diagonal entry is dominated is bounded away from zero, i.e., it is at least 1 3 − o(1).
Proof Let E i be the event that A ii is dominating. We get that:
Also for n ≥ 6 we have that
for i = j = k = i. To prove this let D i correspond to the events A ii > A it for all t = i, j, k (in same way the definition of D j , D k ). Clearly D i , D j , D k are independent and thus Pr
Finally by counting argument (count all the favor permutations) we get that
For l = o(n), for example l = log n and using the fact that n−i 2n−i−1 is decreasing with respect to i we get that
Therefore (inclusion-exclusion) we have that
which is bounded away from zero. Combining Lemma 5.6 above with Corollary 5.5 we derive the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 5.7. Assume that each entry of A is chosen iid from a continuous distribution then the probability that diversity survives for all but a negligible set of initial conditions is bounded away from zero. More specifically, it is at least 1 3 − o(1) as n → ∞.
Remark 5.8. Observe that letting X i be the indicator random variable that A ii is dominating and X = i X i we get that E[X] = i E[X i ] = i Pr[E i ] = n × 1 n = 1 so in expectation we will have one dominating element. Also from above follows that E[
We finish the section with one last observation that describes an interesting property of the mixed Nash stable fixed points. Note that Nash stable is a super set of all the other stable sets, and since if x is Nash stable then matrix T (A, x) is negative semi-definite, this condition holds for all the other notions of stability. Using this property we show the next lemma. Lemma 5.9 . Given a fixed point r, if T (A, r) is negative semi-definite, then ∀i ∈ SP (r), A ii ≤ 2A ij , ∀i = j ∈ SP (r). Moreover if r is a mixed Nash stable then it has in its support at most one strategy t with A tt is dominating.
Proof A negative semi-definite matrix has the property that all the diagonal elements are nonpositive. Observe that from definition of T (A, r), we can choose any strategy to be removed that is in SP (r), hence we choose i and we look at entry
Hardness Results
For there to be any positive chance of survival of phenotypic diversity (survival of diverse alleles) in the limit under the evolutionary pressure of selection (1), existence of a mixed linearly stable fixed-point is a necessary condition (Theorem 4.7). In this section we show that checking if there exists a mixed stable profile may not be easy for any of the five notions of stability (Definitions 4. 1, 4.2, 4.6 and 4.8) . Recall that by mixed we mean strictly mixed, i.e., p such that |SP (p)| > 1, and strategy that is not strictly-mixed are called pure.
In particular, we show that the problem of checking if there exists a mixed (linearly) stable fixed-point of dynamics (1), or if there exists a mixed Nash stable strategy for game (A, A) are NP-hard. The reduction also gives NP-hardness for checking if a given strategy is played with non-zero probability at a stable fixed-point of (1), or at a Nash stable strategy of game (A, A). Thus, it is NP-hard to check if an allele is going to survive in the limit under the evolution. Note that since there always exists a stable fixed-point, to show the hardness we will create A such that there are pure stable fixed-points. Next we extend all these results to asymptotically stable and strict Nash stable notions in Section 6.2, via a different construction.
For a matrix A with iid entries from any continuous distribution, we note in Remark 5.8 that in expectation it has exactly one strategy with dominating diagonal. One could ask does the problem become easier for this typical case. We answer negatively (in Section 6.3) by extending all the NP-hardness results to this case as well.
All the reductions are from k-Clique, a well known NP-complete problem [8] .
Definition 6.1. k-Clique Given an undirected graph G = (V, E), with vertex set V and edge set E, and an integer 1 < k < |V |, decide if G has a clique of size k.
Properties of G. Given a simple graph G = (V, E) (no self-loops or multiple edges) if we create a new graph G by adding a vertex u and connecting it to all the vertices v ∈ V , then it is easy to see that graph G has a clique of size k if and only if G has a clique of size k + 1. Therefore, wlog we can assume that there exists a vertex in G which is connected to all the other vertices. Further, if n = |V |, then such a vertex is the n th vertex. By abuse of notation we will use E an adjacency matrix of G too, E ij = 1 if edge (i, j) present in G else it is zero.
Hardness for checking stability
In this section we show NP-completeness results for decision versions on Nash stable strategies and stable fixed-points. Given the graph G and integer 1 < k < n, next we construct a symmetric 2n × 2n matrix A, depicted pictorially in Figure 1 . Figure 1 : Matrix A as defined in (7) Clearly, A is a symmetric matrix. First we wish to show that if graph G has a k-clique then there exists a mixed strategy that is stable fixed-point and is Nash stable. Since, stable fixed-points ⊆ Nash stable (Theorem 4.13), it is enough to map k-clique to the former. Lemma 6.2. If there exists a clique of size at least k in the graph G, then f of (1) has a mixed stable fixed-point.
Proof Let vertex set C ⊂ V forms a clique of size k in graph G. Construct a maximal clique containing C, by adding vertices that are connected to all the vertices in the current clique. Let the corresponding vertex set be V S ⊂ V (C ⊂ V S ), S = {i | v i ∈ V S } be the index set, and let m = |S| ≥ k. Now we construct a strategy profile p ∈ ∆ 2n and show that it is a stable SNE of game (A, A).
We will show that p is a local maximum of the potential function π(x) = x T Ax, and then the proof follows using Theorem 4.3. In particular we will show that ∃ > 0 such that ∀q ∈ ∆ 2n where p − q ≤ we have π(p) ≥ π(q).
If p − q ≤ then it is easy to see i≤2n |p i − q i | ≤ 2n because p and q are 2n dimensional vectors. Let γ = 2n . We have:
Since A ij ≤ 1 for i, j ≤ n, A i(n+i) = k − 0.5, i ≤ n, and A i j ≤ h for i, j > n (see (7)), we have:
Let α = n+1≤i≤2n q i . Since p i = 0 for n + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n, we have α ≤ γ. Note that i≤n q i = 1 − n+1≤i≤2n q i = 1 − α. Also note that for i ≤ n we have p i ≤ 1 m and therefore q i ≤ 1 m + . Thus,
Since m ≥ k we have
1+h+2(k−0.5) and = γ 2n implies π(q) ≤ 1. Note that π(p) = 1 because A ij = 1 for i, j ∈ SP (p). Therefore, π(q) ≤ π(p), i.e., p is a local maximum.
To obtain converse (of Lemma 6.2) it is enough to show that mixed Nash stable strategies maps to k-clique in graph G. For this, next we map (special) symmetric NE of game (A, A) to k sized clique of graph G. Proof Since A ij ≤ 1, ∀i, j ≤ n, we have (Ap) i ≤ 1, ∀i ≤ n. Recall that vertex v n ∈ V is connected with every other vertex in G. Therefore, (Ap) n = r≤n A nr p r = 1. This implies ∀i ∈ SP (p), (Ap) i ≥ (Ap) n = 1, and hence ∀i ∈ SP (p), (Ap) i = 1. This is possible only if ∀i, j ∈ SP (p)A ij = 1, implying vertex set S = {v i | i ∈ SP (p)} forms a clique.
Next we show that |S| = |SP (p)| ≥ k. Suppose not, then ∃r, p r ≥ 1 k−1 . Now consider the payoff from strategy n + r, which is (Ap) n+r = (k − 0.5)p r ≥ k−0.5 k−1 > 1 = (Ap) i , i ∈ SP (p). A contradiction to p being symmetric NE.
The next lemma follows essentially using Lemmas 5.9 and 6.3. Lemma 6.4. If game (A, A) has a mixed strategy that is Nash stable, then graph G has a clique of size k.
Proof Let p be a Nash stable strategy of game (A, A) , then by definition p is a SNE and matrix B = T (A, p) is negative semi-definite. The latter implies SP (p) ⊂ [n] using Lemma 5.9, as for i / ∈ [n] A ii = h > 2k > 2A ij , ∀j = i. Applying Lemma 6.3 using this fact together with the p being an SNE and |SP (p)| > 1 implies G has a clique of size k.
The next theorem follows using Theorem 4.13, Lemmas 6.2 and 6.4, and the property observed in Lemma 4.14. Since there is no polynomial-time verifiable condition for stable fixed-points 7 its containment in NP is not clear, while for Nash stable strategies containment in NP follows from the Definition 4.8. Theorem 6.5. Given a symmetric matrix A,
• it is NP-complete to check if game (A, A) has a mixed strategy that is Nash stable (or linearly stable).
• it is NP-hard to check if dynamics f of (1) has a mixed stable fixed-point.
even if A is assumed to be a positive matrix.
Hardness for checking strict stability
In this section we extend all the results of Section 6.1 to strict Nash stable and asymptotically stable notions. Given the graph G and integer 1 < k < n − 1, next we construct a symmetric 2n × 2n matrix A, that is a slight modification of (7) . Figure 2 depicts matrix A pictorially. Recall that E is the adjacency matrix of graph G.
if i, j > n and i = j, where h > 2k + 4 0 otherwise
Recall Definition 4.8 of strict Nash stable strategies. Lemma 6.6. If there exists a clique of size at least k in the graph G then game (A, A) has a mixed strategy that is strict Nash stable.
Proof Let vertex set C ⊂ V forms a clique of size k in graph G. Construct a maximal clique containing C, by adding vertices that are connected to all the vertices in the current clique. Let the corresponding vertex set be V S ⊂ V (C ⊂ V S ), S = {i | v i ∈ V S } be the index set, and let m = |S| ≥ k. Now we construct a strategy profile p ∈ ∆ 2n and show that it is a strict Nash stable of game (A, A). Proof Note that SP (p) = S. To prove the claim we need to show that (Ap) i > (Ap) j , ∀i ∈ S, ∀j / ∈ S, and (Ap) i = (Ap) j , ∀i, j ∈ S. Since V S forms a clique in graph G, and by construction (8) of A, the payoff from i th pure strategy against p is Next consider the corresponding transformed matrix B = T (A, p) as defined in (4) . Let S = {i 1 , . . . , i m } and since n = max i∈S i, let i m = n. Since A ij = 1∀i, j ∈ S, i = j and A ii = 0, ∀i ∈ S, we have
Proof It is easy to check that all eigenvalues of B are strictly negative. w 1 = 1 m−1 is an eigenvector with eigenvalue −m, and ∀1 < i < m, vector w i , where w i 1 = 1 and w i i = −1, is an eigenvector with eigenvalue −1. Further, w 1 , . . . , w m−1 are linearly independent.
Thus by Definition 4.8 p is a strict Nash stable for game (A, A).
As strict Nash stable are also asymptotically stable (Theorem 4.13), Lemma 6.6 implies existence of the latter too if graph G has a clique of size k. The next step is to map mixed strict Nash stable and asymptotically stable to clique of size k. Again it suffices to just map mixed asymptotically stable to k-clique, as the other case follows using Theorem 4.13. Towards this, first we lower-bound the support of a mixed symmetric NE, if the support is contained in [n]. Lemma 6.9. Let p be a SNE of game (A, A). If SP (p) ⊂ [n] and |SP (p)| > 1, then p n > 0 and |SP (p)| ≥ k.
Proof Recall that A ni = 1, ∀i < n and A ii = 0, ∀i ≤ n. If n / ∈ SP (p), then for i ∈ SP (p), (Ap) n = 1 > 1 − p i ≥ (Ap) i , a contradiction to p being a SNE.
So n ∈ SP (p). Therefore, ∀i ∈ SP (i), 1 − p n = (Ap) n = (Ap
Next we relate negative definiteness of matrix T (A, p) with clique of size |SP (p)| in graph G. Proof It suffices to show that A ij = 1, ∀i = j ∈ SP (p). To the contrary suppose A ij = 0, for some i = j ∈ SP (p). Clearly, i, j = n.
Clearly, the submatrix of B corresponding to rows and columns {i, j} is −2 −2 −2 −2 , which is not negative definite. Since each principle sub-matrix of a negative definite matrix is negative definite [22] , B is not negative definite.
Recall that attracting fixed-points are strict local optima of π. Using this next we show a general lemma that proves negative definiteness of T (A, p) if p is attracting. Let α = 2 max i |y i | , w = α[y 0 n−k ] and p = p + w, then |p − p | < . Further,
Finally, using the above three lemmas we map mixed asymptotically stable fixed-point to kclique. 
Since p is also a symmetric NE of game (A, A) (Theorem 4.13), the proof follows using Lemmas 6.9 and 6.10.
The next theorem follows using Theorem 4.13, Lemmas 6.6 and 6.12, and the property shown in Lemma 4.14. Since there is no polynomial-time verifiable condition characterizing attracting fixed-points, showing its containment in NP is not clear. However, for strict Nash stable strategies containment in NP follows from the definition. Theorem 6.13. Given a symmetric matrix A,
• it is NP-complete to check if game (A, A) has a mixed strategy that is strict Nash stable.
• it is NP-hard to check if dynamics f of (1) has a mixed asymptotically stable fixed-point. even if A is assumed to be a positive matrix.
Hardness when single dominating diagonal
A symmetric matrix, with iid entries from any continuous distribution, has in expectation exactly one row with dominating diagonal (see Remark 5.8) . One could ask does the problem become easier for this typical case. We answer negatively by extending all the NP-hardness results of Sections 6.1 and 6.2 to this case as well, where matrix A has exactly one row whose diagonal entry dominates all other entries of the row.
Consider the following modification of matrix A from (7) and (8), where we add an extra row and column. Matrix M is of dimension (2n + 1) × (2n + 1), described pictorially in Figure 3 . Clearly M has exactly one row/column with dominating diagonal, namely (2n + 1). Again to map k-clique in graph G to stable fixed-point, and there by also to Nash stable strategy (using Theorem 4.13), we show the following. Lemma 6.14. If graph G has a clique of size k, then game (M, M ) has a mixed strategy that is stable fixed-point of f if A is from (7) .
Proof The proof of this lemma is same as the proof of lemma 6.2, as even if we h with 3h in all the calculations, the proof will go through. In particular, since M ij ≤ 3h for i, j > n setting
1+3h+2(k−0.5) and = γ 2n will work. Now for k-clique to mixed strict Nash stable strategy, and there by to mixed asymptotically stable fixed-point, consider the strategy constructed in Lemma 6.6. It padded with p 2n+1 = 0 is strict stable Nash in game (M, M ) for corresponding A from (8) . This is because their support is a subset of [n], implying the extra strategy giving zero payoff which is strictly less than the expected payoff. Thus, we get the following lemma. Lemma 6.15 . If graph G has a clique of size k, then game (M, M ) has a mixed strategy that is strict Nash stable if A is from (8) .
Next we show the converse. Nash stable strategies are super set of other three notion of stability (Theorem 4.13) . Further, if p is Nash stable then T (M, p) is negative semi-definite (by definition). Using this property together with the lemmas from previous two section and Theorem 4.13, next we map a stable strategy, for any of the four notions of stability, to a k-clique. Lemma 6.16 . Graph G has a clique of size k, if either of the following holds.
• Game (M, M ) has a mixed strategy that is Nash stable (or linearly stable) when A is from (7) .
• Dynamics f of (1) applied to M has a mixed stable fixed-point, when A is from (7) .
• Game (M, M ) has a mixed strategy that is strict Nash stable when A is from (8) .
• Dynamics f of (1) applied to M has a mixed attracting fixed-point, when A is from (8) .
Proof Let q be the said strategy, then in either of the two cases q is a symmetric NE of game (M, M ) and T (M, q) is negative semi-definite and |SP (q)| > 1. Then using Lemma 5.9 we have SP (q) ⊆ [n], as for i = 2n + 1, M ii = 3h > 2M ij , ∀j = i implying 2n + 1 / ∈ SP (p), and ∀n < i ≤ 2n, M ii = h > 2k > 2A ij , ∀j ∈ SP (p). Thus for 2n-dimensional vector p, where p i = q i , i ≤ 2n, we have T (A, p) = T (M, q) and p is a symmetric NE of game (A, A). Thus, stability property of q on matrix M carries forward to corresponding stability of p on matrix A.
The first and second part, where A is from (7), follows using Lemma 6.4. The third and the fourth part, where A is from (8) • it is NP-complete to check if game (M, M ) has a mixed Nash stable (or linearly stable) strategy.
• it is NP-complete to check if game (M, M ) has a mixed strict Nash stable strategy.
• it is NP-hard to check if dynamics f of (1) applied on M has a mixed stable fixed-point.
• it is NP-hard to check if dynamics f of (1) applied on M has a mixed asymptotically stable fixed-point.
even if A is a assumed to be strictly positive.
Hardness for subset. Another natural question to ask is whether an allele is going to survive with positive probability in the limit for a given fitness matrix. We show that this may not be easy either, by proving hardness for checking if there exists a stable strategy p such that i ∈ SP (p) for a given i. In general, given a subset S of pure strategies it is hard to check if ∃ a stable profile p such that S is a subset of SP (p). • it is NP-complete to check if game (M, M ) has a Nash stable (or linearly stable) strategy p s.t. S ⊂ SP (p).
• it is NP-complete to check if game (M, M ) has a strict Nash stable strategy p s.t. S ⊂ SP (p).
• it is NP-hard to check if dynamics f of (1) applied on M has a stable fixed-point p s.t. S ⊂ SP (p).
• it is NP-hard to check if dynamics f of (1) applied on M has a asymptotically stable fixed-point p s.t. S ⊂ SP (p).
even if |S| = 1, or if A is a assumed to be strictly positive or with exactly one row with dominating diagonal.
Proof The reduction is again from k-clique. Our constructions of (7), (8) and (9) works as is, and the target set is S = {n}.
Recall that vertex v n ∈ V is connected to every other vertex in G, and therefore is part of every maximal clique. Thus the construction of strategy p in Lemmas 6.2, 6.6, 6.15 and 6.14 will have p n > 0, and therefore if k-clique exist then S ⊂ SP (p).
For the converse consider a Nash stable strategy p with n ⊂ SP (p). By definition it is a symmetric NE, and therefore SP (p) = {n} as in all cases row n has dominated diagonal, i.e., A nn ≤ 1 < k − δ = A n,2n . Thus, p is a mixed profile, and then by applying Lemmas 6.4, 6.12 and 6.16, for the respective cases we get that graph G has a k-clique. Thus proof follows using Theorem 4.13 and property of Lemma 4.14.
Checking survival of diversity. Finally we state the hardness result in terms of survival of phenotypic diversity in the limiting population of diploid organism with single locus. For this case, as we discussed before, the evolutionary process has been studied extensively [31, 32, 27, 28] , and that it is governed by dynamics f of (1) has been established. Here A is a symmetric fitness matrix; A ij is the fitness of an organism with alleles i and j in the locus of two chromosomes. Thus, for a given A the question of deciding "If phenotypic diversity will survive with positive probability?" translates to "If dynamics f converges to a mixed fixed-point with positive probability?". We wish to show NP-hardness for this question.
Theorem 4.7 establishes that all, except for zero-measure, of starting distributions f converges to linearly stable fixed-points. From this we can conclude that "Yes" answer to the above question implies existence of a mixed linearly stable fixed-point. However the converse may not hold. In other words, "No" answer does not imply non-existence of mixed linearly stable fixed-point. Although, in that case we can conclude non-existence of mixed stable fixed-point (by definition). Thus, none of the above reductions seem to directly give NP-hardness for our question.
At this point, the fact that same reduction (of Section 6.1) gives NP-hardness for both stable as well as linearly stable (Nash stable) fixed-points come to our rescue. In particular, for the matrix A of (7) non-existence of mixed stable fixed-point imply non-existence of mixed linearly stable fixed-point. If not, then graph G will have k-clique (Lemma 6.4 and Theorem 4.13), which in turn implies existence of a stable fixed-point (Lemma 6.2). Therefore, we can conclude that mixed linearly stable fixed-point exist if and only if f converges to a mixed fixed-point with positive probability. and thus the next theorem follows. Theorem 6.19. Given a fitness matrix A for a diploid organism with single locus, it is NP-hard to decide if, under evolution, the diversity will survives with positive probability when starting allele frequencies are picked iid from a continuous distribution. Also, deciding if the given allele will survive with positive probability is NP-hard. Remark 6.20. As noted in Section 3.2, coordination games are very special and they always have a pure Nash equilibrium; for general games this problem is PPAD-complete [35, 10, 6] . Thus, it is natural to wonder if decision versions on coordination games are also easy to answer.
In the process of obtaining the above hardness results, we stumbled upon NP-hardness for checking if a symmetric coordination game has a NE (not necessarily symmetric) where each player randomizes among at least k strategies. Again the reduction is from k-clique. Thus, it seems highly probable that other decision version on (symmetric) coordination games are also NP-complete.
Discussion
The unpredictability of evolution is an experimental reality that biologists are well acquainted with [20, 12, 37] . Our results show that this intuition can actually be formalized even in rather constrained classes of diploid evolution (i.e., single locus systems). These results indicate that our understanding of diversity questions will probably continue to depend to a large extent on low dimensional simulations. Naturally, given our inherent interest in understanding diversity issues, a rather important challenge is to define tractable metrics that reflect some aspects of population polymorphism. Given our expansive set of hardness results this appears to be a rather nontrivial exercise.
Finally, it is interesting to quantify how diversity is affected by the introduction of mutations and other stochastic elements. Naturally, mutations encourage diversity, however, capturing the exact trade offs between diversity and mutation rates would significantly enhance our understanding of evolutionary mechanisms.
On game theory front, our results seem to suggest that decision versions of even two-player coordination games may be hard. The question is which ones are actually hard, and how hard they are. We note that checking if there exist a NE with payoff h is easy, since highest payoff NE is always pure in coordination games, and therefore not all that are hard for general two-player games [19, 7] may not follow.
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A Proof of Theorem 4.7
The proof of the following theorem follows the proofs that can be found in [34, 30] To prove Theorem 4.7, we will make use of the following important theorem in dynamical systems. 
To use the theorem above we need to project the map of the dynamics 1 to a lower dimensional space. We consider the (diffeomorphism) function g that is a projection of the points x ∈ R n to R n−1 by excluding a specific (the "first") variable. We denote this projection of ∆ n by g(∆ n ), i.e., x → g (x ) where x = (x 2 , . . . , x n ). Further, we define the fixed-point dependent projection function z r where we remove one variable x t so that r t > 0 (like function g but the removed strategy must be chosen with positive probability at r).
Let f be the map of dynamical system (1) . For a linearly unstable fixed point r we consider the function ψ r (v) = z r • f • z −1 r (v) which is C 1 local diffeomorphism (due to theorem 3.2 we know that the rule of the dynamical system is a diffeomorphism), with v ∈ R n−1 . Let B r be the (open) ball that is derived from Theorem A.1 and we consider the union of these balls (transformed in R n−1 ) A = ∪ r A r where A r = g(z −1 r (B r )) (z −1 r "returns" the set B r back to R n ). Set A r is an open subset of R n−1 (by continuity of z r ). Taking advantage of separability of R n−1 we have the following theorem. Therefore due to the above theorem, we can find a countable subcover for A, i.e., there exists fixed-points r 1 , r 2 , . . . such that A = ∪ ∞ m=1 A rm .
For a t ∈ N let ψ t,r (v) the point after t iteration of dynamics (1), starting with v, under projection z r , i.e., ψ t,r (v) = z r • f t • z −1 r (v). If point v ∈ int g(∆ n ) (which corresponds to g −1 (v) in our original ∆ n ) has a linearly unstable fixed point as a limit, there must exist a t 0 and m so that ψ t,rm • z rm • g −1 (v) ∈ B rm for all t ≥ t 0 (we have point-wise convergence from Theorem 3.2) and therefore again from Theorem A.1 we get that ψ t 0 ,rm • z rm • g −1 (v) ∈ W sc loc (r m ), hence v ∈ g • z −1 rm • ψ −1 t 0 ,rm (W sc loc (r m )).
Hence the set of points in int g(∆ n ) whose ω-limit has a linearly unstable equilibrium is a subset of
Since r m is linearly unstable, it has dim(E u ) ≥ 1, and therefore dimension of W sc loc (r m ) is at most n − 2. Thus, the manifold W sc loc (r m ) has Lebesgue measure zero in R n−1 . Finally since
